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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an analysis of a typical hypothetical investment in an R&D project 
that leads first to a series of orbiting experiments launched by the NASAShuttle, and later to 
a commercial production process carried out in space. The eventual profitability is quite large, 
recovering the total outlay in the first two years of commercial operation, with comparable 
profits continuing many more years into the future. However, there is an 8-year delay between 
inception of the R&D and realization of a profit stream. As a result, the Internal Rate of 
Return is only in the 30% range, which reduces this R&D program to being merely competitive 
with other corporate investment opportunities. When the risk of failure (inherent in any R&D 
project) is factored in, the space commercialization project becomes considerably less attractive. 
This paper analyzes the effects of alternate means of financing such a project, and comments 
on the differences in risk perceived by diverse investors. In order to investigate the viewpoint 
of an R&D Limited Partnership, the use of high leverage to finance the venture is modeled. 
Under certain circumstances, an RDLP may be an advantageous mechanism for investing in 
space commercialization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of space commercialization [ 1,21 is alluring because of the outstanding 
potential associated with exploring new fields. Yet industry is by no means stampeding to get 
aboard the Space Shuttle, despite the favorable terms offered by NASA. It is therefore appro- 
priate to ask why this condition prevails [3,4]. 
Factors such as a lack of knowledge of what is feasible today constitute an obstacle to 
commercialization, and NASA is moving to alleviate that condition. Another major obstacle is 
the very long lead times associated with space ventures, and this leads directly into the theme 
of this paper. The fact is that, when examined by the standard financial-analysis methods 
commonly used today, most space commercialization investment opportunities do not look 
sufficiently attractive to secure the corporate commitment needed to persevere over a long 
gestation period. Entering a space-commercialization enterprise requires a CEO decision to 
start down a new path; a predisposition to apply financial analysis methods to future business 
opportunities in space will quite likely militate against such decisions. 
How profitable does a space venture have to be in order to compete with other con- 
ventional investment opportunities ? In order to provide a quantitative answer to this question, 
we have carried out a series of return-on-investment calculations for a typical hypothetical 
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investment in an R&D program that leads to a new product produced in space. The investment 
provides a very generous stream of profits for 10 years or more. Nevertheless, the detailed 
analysis of the discounted after-tax cash flow associated with this investment reveals why the 
typical industrial investor has only limited enthusiasm for the opportunity to commercialize 
space. 
It must be recognized at the outset that one single hypothetical example cannot possibly 
represent all the different possibilities. Still, the merit of this example is in showing how the 
perception of an industrial manager is affected by long lead times, so that even the most lucra- 
tive investments deflate to ordinary size when several years of front-end R&D is required before 
profits begin to accrue. 
Section II of this paper describes the proposed investments. Section III presents the 
calculated Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Section IV shows how certain changes in financing 
and/or tax policy might alter the IRR. Section V briefly considers the effects of uncertainty. 
Section VI is a summary. 
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL INVESTMENT 
We assume a 21-year program that begins with 3 years of research, 5 more years of 
development, tests, initial shuttle flights and perfecting the process (the space equivalent of what 
on earth would be the pilot plant phase), and 13 additional years of profitable manufacturing 
of the product in space. This timetable is reasonable for a product that begins with a genuine 
breakthrough in technology and goes on to either create a new market or dominate an existing 
market. 
The product envisioned by the research staff is a metal-matrix composite involving cobalt, 
manganese and tungsten, having exceptional strength and uniformity. Making it requires liquid 
tungsten (temperature 4000°K) to be contained for many minutes during production, in the 
absence of any magnetic fields. As such, no earthbound containment system is acceptable, and 
so the entire operation must be carried out in the weightlessness of orbit. (Readers more com- 
fortable with pharmaceuticals or semiconductors can readily make the adjustment to apply the 
numbers in this case to examples drawn from their own fields of interest.) 
The initial research phase leads to a go/no-go decision before embarking on major hard- 
ware expenditures. The costs are $150,000, $450,000 and $800,000 in the first 3 years. If the 
decision is made to go ahead, then in year 4, as spaceflight hardware begins to enter the picture, 
R&D costs total $2.6 million. Year 5 requires $5 million in R&D costs and $5 million in capital 
investment. Year 6 (when the first two launches occur) required $8 million in R&D costs and 
$12 million in capital investment. This concludes the R&D phase. A second go/no-go decision 
occurs at this point. If the initial space flight tests are successful, then the certainty of profit- 
ability downstream is assured, and so the decision is made to move forward with a major com- 
mittment of capital and hardware construction. 
As refinement of production moves forward, we hypothesize for year 7 a major input 
of capital equipment totaling $30 million, accompanied by engineering costs of $10 million. 
In year 8, with full scale production nearing readiness, additional capital requirements are only 
$10 million, but now there are $15 million in engineering costs. 
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The total face-value cost up to this point has been $57 million in capital expenditures, 
$17 million in R&D, and $25 million in engineering costs. Table I summarizes these expendi- 
tures. At this point the company has spent almost $100 million (over 8 years) but has not 
yet seen any profits. 
TABLE I. CASH FLOW STREAMS ASSOCIATED WITH PRODUCTION OF 
NEW MATERIAL IN SPACE 
YEAR R&D COSTS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
IO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
ia 
19 
20 
21 
START-UP 
ENGINEERING 
CAPITAL 
EXPENSES PROFITS 
$150,000 
450,000 
800,000 
2,600,OOO 
5,000,000 
a,ooo,ooo 
10,000,000 
15,000,000 
1 o,ooo,ooo 
7,500,000 
4,080,ooo 
2,720,OOO 
i,a20,000 
1,210,000 
810,000 
540,000 
360,000 
240,000 
160,000 
110,000 
70,000 
5,000,000 
12,000,000 
30,000,000 
10,000,000 
32,000,OOO 
56,160,OOO 
60,600,000 
65,500,OOO 
70,740,000 
67,740,OOO 
57,580,ooo 
48,940,ooo 
41,600,000 
35,360,Ooo 
30,050,000 
25,550,OOO 
21,710,000 
Once begun, the stream of profits is generous indeed. After a 6-month shakedown 
period, the process for making the metal-matrix composite is fully operational in space, and I 
partway into year 9 a stream of profits begins to occur. * The product quality is so great that 
the corporation’s marketing department estimates that the metal-matrix composite will capture 
85% of the market for electric motor bearings, even at a high selling price. As a result, the 
total profit is expected to be $56 million per year in the first full year of operation. After 
that, profits are expected to escalate 8% per year for the next 4 years, owing to a combination 
of inflation and greater acceptance by customers. 
* Over the next several years of profitable operations, engineering costs will decline steadily as 
bugs are worked out of the system: $10 million in year 9, $7.5 million in year 10, $4 million 
in year 1 1, and declining 33% annually thereafter. 
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Beyond this point, it is conservatively assumed that competitors will somehow enter the 
market, so that profits fall 15% per year for the following 8 years. Actually, it makes very little 
difference what the profits do in the out-years, because the discount rate reduces them to small 
fractions of their face value anyway. Thus long-range uncertainty is not disruptive of investment 
planning calculations done today. The profit stream is also presented in Table I. 
This hypothetical case can be criticized on a variety of points. For example, no descrip- 
tion has been given as to what the capital expenditures are for. Moreover, expenditures for 
working capital have been ignored, and perhaps some part of the engineering and start-up costs 
may be capitalized and then depreciated. Addressing these issues would clutter the example 
with details, and would detract from the point of the paper, which is that long lead times before 
profitability exert a very inhibiting effect upon R&D committments. Virtually all concepts 
whose goal is sustained processing of materials in space have such lead time associated with 
them. In this respect, the example is typical of space commercialization ventures. 
III. INVESTMENT EVALUATION 
In evaluating any proposed investment, a dollar received in the future must be discounted 
at an appropriate rate to determine its present value today. Beyond this, one can choose from a 
variety of evaluation indices, including the Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Equivalent Rate of Return (EqRR), and profitability Index (PI). The Internal Rate of 
Return is that discount rate at which the net present value of initial outlays and later profits 
sums to exactly zero [5 1. 
In this paper we choose the IRR, because it is the most popular index used by corporate 
finance departments. Typically, in today’s economy, corporations seldom invest in projects 
with an IRR below about 30%, even though the cost of borrowing money is down around 15%. 
This is because “mandatory” investments (those needed to keep the company running) have the 
first priority for capital, regardless of their IRR. As a result, “discretionary” investments (in- 
cluding R&D and ventures into new markets) reside far down the list. For most companies, so 
many investments are available each year that total levels of investment are capped by cash flow 
limitations [6]. As we shall see, this condition beckons to third-party financiers to engage in 
joint ventures with companies whose ideas are stymied by such limitations. 
As the discount rate increases, the significance of front-end expenditures is enhanced, 
and returns in later years fade into oblivion. Table II illustrates this point by tabulating the 
appropriate multiplying factors for several years for discount rates of 10, 20 and 30%. In year 
8, for example, a dollar is worth 5 1 cents, 28 cents, and 16 cents. The manager concerned 
with “bottom-line performance” cannot realistically have a horizon longer than 5 years when 
choosing among investment opportunities that offer IRRs above 30%. 
TABLE II. DISCOUNT FACTORS FOR CERTAIN RATES 
d q rate. n = year number. Cz ,/(,+d)n-' 
YEAR 1oz 201 30% 
1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2 .909 .833 .769 
3 .751 .694 .592 
4 .683 .579 .455 
5 .621 .482 .350 
8 .513 .279 .159 
10 .424 .194 .09u 
15 .263 .078 .025 
20 .164 .031 .007 
21 .149 .026 .005 
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Evaluation Indices other than IRR are more appropriate for projects that are lucrative 
but long term. The manager who is concerned with the long term realizes that the cost of 
capital* ultimately sets the hurdle rate, and computes the Net Present Value (NPV) of a long 
term project using that discount rate. This is the only way a long term project that requires 
continuing initial investment can survive the screening process. 
Nevertheless, the IRR is still the index used by the great majority of American corpora- 
tions when evaluating proposed R&D projects. Therefore it is the best choice to illuminate 
our understanding of corporate decision making. For the cash flows presented in Table I, the 
calculated IRR is 30.7%. Of course, this is the pre-tax IRR, which is only of significance to 
corporations that pay no taxes. 
The after-tax IRR is calculated by including depreciation and tax credits, and by using 
a Federal tax rate of 46% with a state tax rate of 4%. The investment Tax Credit (ITC) is 
10% of the capital expenses each year. Depreciation follows the ACRS rules for equipment 
(5-year schedule), but depreciation does not begin until year 8, at which time the entire $57 
million capital investment is eligible. This set of conditions yields the dollar amounts presented 
in Table III. The after tax cash flow is discounted at whatever rate is necessary to give a NPV 
of zero, and this rate is the after tax IRR. 
TABLE III. AFTER TAX CASH FLOW CALCULATION - FUNDING ALL FROM 
EQUITY - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
Year 
Pretax 
Cash 
Fl cw 
(frcm 
Table I) 
Tax abl e 
Inccme 
Tax 
Owed 
Tax 
Credits 
After Tax 
Cash Flow 
Cumulative A’EF 
(Disccunted at 
27.8%) 
1 -.I5 -.I5 -.07 0. -.oa -.oa 
2 -.45 -.45 -.22 0. -.24 -.26 
3 -.a0 -.oa -.3a 0. -.42 -.52 
4 -2.60 -2.60 -1.25 0. -1.35 -1.17 
5 -10.00 -5.00 -2.40 0.50 -7.10 -3.83 
6 -20.00 -8.00 -3.84 1.20 -14.96 -a.23 
7 -40.00 -10.00 -4.80 3.00 -32.20 -15.64 
a -25.00 -26.40 -12.67 1.00 -11.33 -17.67 
9 22.00 3.76 1.80 0. 20.20 -14.83 
IO 48.66 34.98 16.79 0. 31.87 -11.31 
11 56.58 47.46 22.78 0. 33.80 -8.40 
12 62.78 58.22 27.94 0. 34.83 -6.04 
13 68.92 68.92 33.08 0. 35.84 -4.15 
14 66.52 66.52 31.93 0. 34.59 -2.71 
15 56.77 56.77 27.25 0. 29.52 -1.76 
16 48.40 48.40 23.23 0. 25.17 -1.12 
17 41.24 41.24 19.79 0. 21.44 -.69 
ia 35.12 35.12 16.86 0. 18.26 -.41 
19 29.89 29.89 14.35 0. 15.55 -.22 
20 25.44 25.44 12.21 0. 13.23 -.og 
21 21.64 21.64 IO.39 0. 11.25 -.Ol 
* A weighted average of the borrowing rate (15-l 6%) and the return expected on stockholder’s 
equity (25-30%). 
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For our hypothetical example, the IRR is 27.8%. This is a very disappointing figure 
for an investment with such a high profit potential, but it must be recognized that, for example, 
the $33.8 million after-tax gain of year 11 is only worth $2.9 million in today’s dollars when 
discounted at 27.8%. By contrast, the investor who calculates NPV with a fixed corporate 
discount rate of 15% would find that same $33.8 million contributing $8.4 million in today’s 
dollars. Figure 1 displays the variation of after tax NPV of this project with increasing discount 
rate. The curve crosses the horizontal axis at the IRR, and the NPV changes from gain to loss 
there. 
Because of the long waiting time for profits to begin flowing, the NPV of this project 
is quite volatile to changes in the discount rate. For projects with a much shorter time horizon, 
the NPV is less dependent upon later years, and hence less affected by discount rate. It is not 
difficult to construct a 5-year project with an IRR above 30% but a smaller NPV (at 20%) 
than this project’s. The NPV line for the alternate project would then cross the curve of Figure 
1 somewhere around 22 or 25%. If IRR were the main decision-criterion, the short-term project 
would be chosen; but if Profitability Index (PI) or NPV (at 20% opportunity cost of money) 
was used, the space-manufacturing project would win out. 
IV. EFFECT OF CHANGES IN TAXES OR FINANCING 
American space policy recognizes as a goal the desirability of encouraging the private 
sector to commercialize space [7]. Often it has been the custom to use the tax laws as an 
instrument of policy, so it is worth considering how potential investors looking at this space- 
commercialization project would respond to changes in tax law. 
One such change occurred in 198 1, when a 25% tax credit was offered to companies 
who increase their R&D expenditures in a year [8]. Our hypothetical case was first analyzed 
without that tax credit, which gave an IRR of 27.8%. When a 25% tax credit was given for the 
research expenses of the first 3 years, the IRR rose to 28.4%. This difference may seem incon- 
sequential, but remember that the total spending in the first 3 years accumulated to only $1.4 
million out of a $100 million project. The fact that this tax credit has any effect at all is 
because it occurs in the early years. Had a 25% credit been applied to the entire 6-year span 
of R&D, the effect would have been much greater. 
Another possibility that is often discussed in Congress is the use of targeted tax 
credits [6]. For example, the law might be amended to provide an additional 10% tax credit 
for capital investments in space manufacturing. Our calculations indicate that such a change in 
tax law would increase the IRR by less than 2 percentage points, hardly enough to motivate 
a hesitant investor. 
Alternate forms of financing now available in the private sector are likely to be more 
persuasive than government tax changes. Leveraging of investments is possible through a variety 
of new techniques. To model this, we considered the case in which $40 million out of the 
total of $57 million in capital costs was obtained from an external financing source. The $40 
million is borrowed in the middle of year 7, at the rather high fixed interest rate of 20%, to be 
paid back uniformly over 8 years. An 8-year finance lease might be one example of such 
financing. It is incidentally assumed that this new debt will not adversely affect the corpora- 
tion’s bond rating or otherwise drive up its cost of borrowing. This is done to keep the example 
simple. Such “project financing” would not be typical of major corporations, but might repre- 
sent the behavior of an R&D Limited Partnership (RDLP) formed explicitly for this venture. 
Table IV shows the cash flow for this split-financed case. The presence of $820,000 
monthly payments (part principal, part interest) beginning in the middle of year 7 reduce the 
operating cash flow in the early profitable years, but the very tiny capital outlays in years 7 
and 8 compensate for this. Thus cash flow is smaller in each year 7-15 (i.e., less negative in 
7 and 8, less positive thereafter). This causes a small pretax improvement, and a large after tax 
improvement. As a consequence of external financing, the IRR jumps up to 34.0%, compared 
to 28.4% in the unleveraged case. To investors with other options to choose from in the 30% 
IRR range, this difference may be significant. 
TABLE IV. AFTER TAX CASH FLOW CALCULATION - FUNDING INCLUDES 
$40 MILLION BORROWED CAPITAL - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 
Year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
ii 
9 
IO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
la 
19 
20 
21 
Pretax f 
Cash Taxable 
Flow Income 
Tax 
Owed 
Tax 
Credits* 
After Tax 
Cash Flow 
Cumulative 
ATCF (disccunted 
at 34.0%) 
-.I5 -.I5 -.07 .04 -.04 -.04 
-.45 -.45 -.22 .I1 -.I2 -.I3 
-.a0 -.a0 -.38 .20 -.22 -.25 
-2.60 -2.60 -1.25 .oo -1.35 -.a1 
-10.00 -5.00 -2.40 .50 -7.10 -3.01 
-20.00 -8.00 -3.84 1.20 -14.96 -6.47 
-14.95 -13.87 -6.66 4.00 -4.29 -7.21 
-24.89 -34.50 -16.56 0. -a.33 -a.29 
12.11 -4.21 -2.02 0. 14.13 -6.93 
38.77 27.95 13.42 0. 25.35 -5.11 
46.68 41.52 19.93 0. 26.75 -3.68 
52.88 53.55 25.71 0. 27.18 -2.60 
59.03 65.74 31.56 0. 27.47 -1.78 
56.63 64.83 31.12 0. 25.52 -1.22 
51.82 56.57 27.15 0. 24.67 -.a1 
48.40 48.40 23.23 0. 25.17 -.50 
41.24 41.24 19.79 0. 21.44 -.30 
35.12 35.12 16.86 0. 18.26 -.17 
29.89 29.89 14.35 0. 15.55 -.09 
25.44 25.44 12.21 0. 13.23 -.04 
21.64 21.64 IO.39 0. 11.25 -.Ol 
f Includes monthly payments of $.82 million in years 7-15 
i 
Includes 25% R&D Credit for years l-3. 
The driving force that makes the leveraged investment more attractive is that money 
borrowed at 20% is earning a substantially higher rate. Every homeowner experiences the same 
advantage: when the house increases 10% in value, if it is 75% mortgaged, the homeowner’s 
return on equity is 40%. The tax deductibility of interest payments mitigate the burden of the 
20% interest rate for the RDLP or leveraged corporation. 
356 
Combinations of leveraging and government support enhance the attractiveness of the 
investment still further. For example, a 10% additional tax credit adds 4 percentage points to 
the IRR; and a government-subsidized loan at 10% instead of 20% adds 1.6 percentage points. 
Table V collects and summarizes the several variations upon the original example. The 
essential point to be grasped from all this financial discussion is that there is an incentive for the 
leveraged investor (RDLPs, joint ventures, etc.) to participate in space commercialization. The 
same opportunity in space carries a disincentive to the equity-funded investor (or large corpora- 
tion relying upon conventional IRR analysis) because of the exceptionally long lead times asso- 
ciated with R&D ventures in space. 
TABLE V. IRR UNDER VARIOUS OPTIONS 
BASE CASE 
with 25% tax credit on R&D portion 
Unconventional Financing 
2/S of capital borrowed at 20% 
Subsidized Loan 
2/j of capital borrowed at 10% 
Additional 10% tax credit 
All Equity Financing 
2/3 of capital borrowed at 20% 
27.8% 
28.4% 
34.0% 
35.6% 
29.6% 
33.6% 
V. RISK 
So far, the example has treated the various cash flow items as fixed and certain, when 
in reality, the project is encumbered with considerable uncertainty. The cash flow is by no 
means definite, especially in later years. Risk goes both ways: profits may not materialize, or 
they may be greater than expectations, or hold up longer. 
There are two points where a go/no-go decision is made, and we have only looked at the 
outcome when the decision is “go.” Were the project to be stopped at either of those points, 
the total preceding expenditure would be lost. The estimated return on investment should be 
lowered in order to compensate for that possibility. 
The proper treatment of risk is the subject of an extensive literature [9]. Here we only 
observe that the size of the corporation strongly influences their ability to bear risk. For a large 
company in which an R&D Expenditure of $1.4 million is small, the simple “expected value” 
method of predicting NPV is adequate. For a small company, the penalty for failure may be 
bankruptcy, in which case their perceived risk will be much higher and their approach far more 
hesitant. 
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The expected value method is relatively simple: here the cash flow in each year is 
multiplied by the probability that the project is still ongoing in that year. The resulting NPV 
or IRR is the expected value of the NPV or IRR. Referring to our example, suppose that the 
probability is l/2 that the first R&E hurdle will be overcome, and hence the project will proceed 
beyond 3 years. Assume further that at the second go/no-go point, the decision is made to go 
ahead. But then let the probability be only l/2 that the profits will materialize as predicted - 
this corresponds to a cautious guess about the market share that can be captured with the new 
space-produced alloy. To represent this, the cash flows in Table I would be revised by multi- 
plying the first 3 values by 1, all subsequent costs by l/2, and all the profits by l/4. The 
expected value of the NPV can be termed the “utility” of the investment [ lo]. Obviously the 
expected value of any index of performance will decline sharply. 
We have modeled this “expected value” case and calculated the after tax IRR to be 
15.7%, a precipitous drop from the “sure-thing” figure of 28.4%. If the investment is 
leveraged as described in the preceding section, Table III has to be similarly revised and the 
resulting after tax IRR is 17.6%, down from 34%. For such a return, borrowing at 20% becomes 
of questionable value. However, given the freedom to bail out after 3 years with only a $1.4 
million loss, the question posed to either investor by these expected value calculations is “Am I 
willing to invest $1.4 million to reach that first decision point. 7” For such an R&D-level decision, 
an expected return of 1518% is not too bad. 
When a company cannot afford to lose big, they are not likely to enter into a project 
such as this. Consider a medium-sized company in which a $1.4 million R&D loss is tolerable, 
but a $34 million loss (the total cost of reaching the second go/no-go decision point) is not. 
Assume the company’s survival is seriously threatened by such a loss. In that case, the weighted 
value of the various outcomes will greatly distort their outlook on this project. The utility of 
the expenditures in years 4 through 6 will be so large and negative that the utility of the entire 
project (the weighted expected value of the NPV) will be negative. Thus for this company the 
proper decision at the outset is not to pursue the project. 
Down-side risk is not the only kind of uncertainty; the possibility of some major scien- 
tific breakthrough is equally important. Yet very few business investors give any weight to 
concepts like the value to future generations. Such very long term risks and rewards belong to 
the entire society. 
Finding ways to encourage mediLm~-sized companies to take risks puts us at once into 
questions of public policy [4]. Such avenues as loan guarantees, research grants, and free flight 
opportunities offered by NASA, all fall within that category. Here it suffices to note that the 
weighted value of risk is an extra disincentive to all but very large corporations. 
VI. SUMMARY 
By following a single hypothetical example through a series of variations, we have 
described how different potential investors might look at the opportunity to participate in space 
commercialization. The viewpoints represented include those of large and small, equity-based 
and leveraged investors. 
The example itself is fairly typical of commercial opportunities in space. The chief 
characteristics are a steadily increasing requirement for capital infusion over an 8-year period, 
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followed by a very generous stream of profits running another decade or more beyond. There 
is a decision point at 3 years, at the conclusion of laboratory R&D; and another at 6 years, 
following 2 initial space flights. 
Many companies compute the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) enroute to evaluating an 
investment opportunity, and this has been done here. The IRR is constrained from becoming 
very large by the long lead time for profits; the value of distant dollars is reduced to insignifi- 
cance as the IRR nears 30%. For this project, the Net Present Value (NPV) responds sharply 
to changes in the discount rate, as shown in Figure 1. 
Changes in government tax policy have been analyzed as well. The new R&D tax credit 
is not important, because R&D is a small fraction of the total project cost. An additional 10% 
tax credit for capital invested in space ventures is not persuasive, either. However, creative new 
financial coalitions, such as RDLPs, may be able to take advantage of leveraging to facilitate 
venturing into space. 
The uncertainty of R&D directed towards space must not be minimized. Large com- 
panies can afford to take risks of the magnitude of a space venture; medium and small firms 
cannot. The advantage of RDLPs is particularly noteworthy here: on the one hand, a total 
loss is acceptable if unpleasant; and on the other, the partners can leverage their individual 
investment shares. Uncertainty and leverage together increase the volatility of return-on- 
investment, but RDLP investors are cognizant of that and willingly accept risk. 
Certain recommendations are implicit in the results of these calculations. First, 
industrial leaders should take an imaginative and long-range view when considering space 
investments, and calculate the NPV of projects instead of the IRR. For its part, NASA should 
maintain its outstanding record of reliability for the Shuttle, resist delays vigorously, and move 
swiftly to accommodate companies getting ready to fly. 
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